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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature by carrying out the first empirical 
investigation into the role of different types of enterprises in the creation of social 
trust. Drawing on a unique dataset collected through the administration of a 
questionnaire to a representative sample of the population of the Italian Province 
of Trento in March 2011, we find that cooperatives are the only type of enterprise 
where the work environment fosters the social trust of workers.  
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1. Introduction 
Cooperative enterprises represent a limited, but growing phenomenon in contemporary economies. 
Since their origins they have been important actors in supporting the most disadvantaged social 
groups, in guaranteeing involvement and community development, and in complementing public 
welfare systems. Their socially oriented nature is mainly connected to their not-for-profit 
entrepreneurial action, to the democratic governance based on the “one member, one vote” rule, and 
to the concern for the community in which they are located, as established by the seventh 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) principle, introduced in the ICA gathering in Manchester 
in 1995 (Stikkers, 2009). Most importantly, in recent years these businesses have strengthened 
resilience to the crisis in most economic systems, by increasing organizational diversity and 
providing proactive answers to worsening economic conditions. While competitive markets and the 
public sector are experiencing serious difficulties in most countries, cooperatives are showing more 
stability and reactivity (Stiglitz 2009). This is mostly because of their reduced reliance on support 
by financial markets resulting in less involvement in the financial crisis. 
Some theoretical works have claimed that the socially oriented nature of cooperatives and their 
inclusive governance may have relevant effects in terms of social cohesion and growth’s 
sustainability (Dow, 2003; Stiglitz 2009; Birchall, 2010). Empirical testing of the social effects of 
cooperative firms is being developed in various directions. The impact of cooperatives on 
sustainable and stable employment has been analysed in seminal papers by Miyazaki and Neary 
(1983) and Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) whose claims have found support in various empirical studies 
(see for example Bonin et al., 1993; Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1994; Burdìn and Dean 2009). More 
recent works focus on the social impact of cooperatives in terms of income inequality, public 
health, employment protection (Ben-Ner et al. 2011; Erdal, 2012; Freundlich and Gago, 2012; 
Perotin, 2012). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no result has been presented to date concerning 
the effects of cooperative firms on the creation and strengthening of social trust, and on the related 
accumulation of social capital.  
This paper contributes to the literature by carrying out the first empirical investigation into the role 
of different types of enterprise in the creation of social trust. Our research question has important 
societal and economic implications because the creation and diffusion of trust is connected to the 
ability of the economy to function properly and to reproduce itself over time. As will be outlined in 
Section 2, the economics literature identifies trust as one of the pillars of economic development. 
Classical and neoclassical economists argued that the well-functioning of markets, the resilience of 
the economic system in times of crisis and, in the long run, the sustainability of growth and 
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development, rely on those institutions (whether formal or informal) that foster the sharing and 
diffusion of feelings of trust and norms of reciprocity (Smith 1759; Mill 1848; Arrow 1972). More 
recently, the social capital literature has provided evidence that trust supports growth and 
development through a number of channels such as, for example, the reduction of transaction costs 
and the enforcement of contracts (Putnam 1993; Knack and Keefer 1997; Guiso et al. 2008; 2009). 
A better understanding on how different entrepreneurial models affect the diffusion of trust would 
thus provide a crucial contribution to the literature and important insights for future research on the 
role organizational diversity. 
Our empirical analysis relies on a unique dataset collected through the administration of a 
questionnaire to a representative sample of the population of the Italian Province of Trento in 
March 2011 (see Section 3 for further details). The dependent variable is given by responses to the 
question: “Thinking about the difference between the day you started your current work and today, 
how do you think that the work environment has influenced your trust towards others?”. 
Interviewees were requested to focus exclusively on changes ascribable to the job they currently 
hold.   
After controlling for sample selection bias, we use ordered probit models to assess the determinants 
of work environment-driven changes in the social trust of workers. Our results show that 
cooperative enterprises can create social trust among workers, unlike any other type of enterprise.  
More specifically, we find that the status of being employed in a cooperative enterprise increases 
the probability that work has improved the social trust of workers by 47.5% relative to employment 
in public enterprises, by 36.9% relative to private enterprises and by 51% relative to self-
employment. This finding suggests that the development of cooperative enterprises – and, more 
generally, of less hierarchical models of governance and of not purely profit maximizing forms of 
enterprises – may play a crucial role in the diffusion of trust and in the accumulation of social 
capital. This may contribute to increased resilience of the economic system, especially in times of 
crisis.  
The design of the questionnaire allows us to exclude the existence of reverse causality, since 
changes occurred in workers’ social trust during their current occupation cannot in any way 
influence their past choice to accept their current job. However, even if the way the trust question 
was posed is conceived to make interviewees focus exclusively on changes related to the 
environment and experience related to their current job, it may have been difficult for them to 
distinguish the effect of employment in cooperative enterprises from other individual or local 
characteristics or shocks that may have influenced the outcome variable. For example, intrinsically  
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motivated individuals may have a higher propensity to trust others and may be more willing to work 
in organizations characterised by participatory and democratic decision-making processes. 
To deal with these issues, we include in the trust equation a wide set of individual and household 
control variables measuring respondents’ values, beliefs, perceptions, and behaviours. In particular, 
we control for workers’ intrinsic motivations as a predictor of the propensity to develop trust. In 
addition, in order to eliminate local-specific heterogeneity, we also run regressions with local fixed 
effects computed at the level of “local labour systems”. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the motivation of the study and briefly 
reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes our data and reports some descriptive statistics. 
The empirical analysis of the role of different types of enterprise in the creation of social trust is 
presented and discussed in section 4. Concluding remarks and a brief discussion of implications for 
future research close the paper. 
 
2. Motivation of the study and related literature 
Cooperatives have been described as membership based entrepreneurial organizations characterized 
by democratic and inclusive governance (Birchall, 2010; Borzaga and Tortia, 2010). The ownership 
of the organization, in terms of residual right of control and residual right of appropriation, is 
bestowed upon members, who  have a personal character and are different from investors 
(Hansmann 1988, 1996). In other words, control over the organization and appropriation of its 
residual value rests with personal membership rights
5
 that, as a norm, is given in equal terms to all 
members (the so-called “One member, one vote” rule). Equality in membership rights implies, at a 
fundamental level, equal decision making power, and equal power in electing representatives in the 
board of directors. A clear difference can be shown, in this context, relative to investor-owned, for-
profit companies. While the latter type of firm is well compatible with concentrated or even 
exclusive ownership (one single person or organization can own the whole capital of an investor 
owned business), the same is not true in cooperatives where, right from the start, a plurality of 
members share control rights in equal terms. Equality in membership rights also implies that the 
governance of the organization is built over an underlying horizontal structure in which decision 
making power is evenly distributed across members. Given this, cooperatives are expected to be 
                                                 
5
 Cooperative enterprises can also be small organizations, as happens in producer and agricultural cooperatives. 
However, this evidence does not fundamentally modify the personal character of membership of cooperatives since, on 
the one hand, small producers and farmers very often coincide with individual or family firms (Valentinov, 2007). On 
the other hand, in legal terms, membership rights are given to organizations as legal persons and not to the capital 
invested in or by these legal persons.    
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less compatible than investor owned companies with hierarchal governance since this kind of 
governance would likely violate the egalitarian distribution of control rights.  
The limited ability of cooperatives to pursue organizational and production efficiency by means of 
top-down, hierarchical decisions has been considered by new-institutional writers as one of their 
main flaws since this feature can lead to uncoordinated and lengthy decision making processes. In 
turn, inefficient organizational processes are expected to generate inflated ownership and 
governance costs (Hansmann, 1996). Yet, while they represent a minority organizational form, 
cooperatives are often observed in market economies and have been reported in some comparative 
studies to reach higher production efficiency than investor owned companies (Craig and Pencavel, 
1992, 1994; Bartlett et al., 1992: Bonin et al., 1993; Burdìn and Dean 2009; Burdìn 2012). Where 
hierarchical governance does not represent the most effective solution for reaching production 
efficiency, cooperatives have been argued to favour inclusion more than hierarchy (Borzaga and 
Tortia, 2010). Participation in decision making and other organizational features related to 
inclusion, such as a high degree of procedural and distributive fairness, can support efficiency, 
though in markedly different ways relative to the case of hierarchy. Horizontal interpersonal and 
inter-organizational relations, more than vertical ones, are likely to emerge within cooperatives and 
to represent the basis of inclusive organizational routines (Erdal, 2011; Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012).  
Horizontal relations and procedural fairness can also be related to the emergence of trust (Thibaut 
and Walker 1975; Lind and Tyler 1988; Putnam 1993; 2000). This may be due to two main reasons: 
on the positive side, procedural fairness better distributes burdens and rewards (both monetary and 
non-monetary) among the involved constituencies, thus creating an expectation of fair future 
rewards and representing, in this way, a crucial precondition for the spontaneous (or endogenous) 
emergence of trust. Some contributions find procedural fairness the most distinguishing 
organizational feature of cooperative firms (Tortia, 2008). Connectedly, on the negative side, the 
spread of fair decisions can discourage morally hazardous and other opportunistic behaviours or 
reinforce the social stigma against them. For example, peer pressure, which is the most typical 
feature of social relations in cooperating teams, has been described as a coordination mechanism 
that reduces shirking and free-riding, therefore increasing team members’ trustworthiness (Mohnen 
et al., 2008; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Degli Antoni and Portale 2011). This can also favour or not 
discourage the endogenous emergence of trust
6
. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to directly 
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 It is worth noting that the spread of trust inside the organization can help to solve the new-institutionalist dilemma 
concerning the growth of transaction costs in terms of ownership and governance costs. In principle, horizontal, non-
hierarchical decision making processes can be expected to be less coordinated and more time and resource expensive 
than hierarchical ones. However, this inefficient outcome may not be observed in reality. Trust relations, tacit 
knowledge and informal interpersonal relations can work as substitutes of hierarchy in supporting expedite and effective 
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test the relation between procedural fairness and the spread of trust in cooperatives vis a vis other 
organizational forms. However, we can test how different entrepreneurial forms – i.e. private, 
public, or cooperative enterprises - affect the diffusion of trust. A response to this question, which 
has never been empirically investigated before, may make a crucial contribution to the literature, in 
that trust represents one of the pillars of the well-functioning of markets and, in the long run, of 
growth and development processes. 
Since the early 1990s, a growing number of studies have identified social capital – with particular 
regard to its “cognitive” dimension of social trust – as a factor of economic and social development. 
Trust has been argued to reduce transactions costs, favour the enforcement of contracts, facilitate 
credit at the level of individual investors, and to encourage innovation and investments in human 
and physical capital (see among others Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak 
and Knack 2011; Guiso et al. 2008; 2009).  
As stated by Knack (2002): “Where social mechanisms for the efficient resolution of prisoners’ 
dilemma and principal-agent games are weak or absent (i.e. where most potential pairs of economic 
transactors cannot trust each other) the private returns to predation increase while the private returns 
to production fall” (p. 171). Individuals in higher-trust societies indeed spend less on protecting 
themselves from being exploited in economic transactions (Knack and Keefer 1997). 
Even if these views have gained credit in the economics debate only recently, it is worth noting that 
the concept of the social “embeddedness” of the economic action is deeply rooted in the history of 
economic thought, and can also be found in the early work of the classical economists. Typical 
code-words of the social capital literature (e.g. trust, norms, values, altruism, and sympathy) can be 
found in the work of Adam Smith. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith (1759) argued that 
there were certain virtues, such as trust and a concern for fairness, that were vital for the functioning 
of a market economy. He described trust and reciprocity as critical foundations of the early 
beginnings of the market, allowing reciprocal gift exchange to emerge, and leading to trade. John 
Stuart Mill shared the belief that trust plays a fundamental role in the economic performance of 
nations. In the Principles of Political Economy (1848), he stated:  
“Conjoint action is possible just in proportion as human beings can rely on each other. There are countries in 
Europe where the most serious impediment to conducting business concerns on a large scale, is the rarity of 
persons who are supposed fit to be trusted with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of money”. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
organizational outcomes; democratic governance can reduce, not inflate, transaction costs. Furthermore, for similar 
reasons, inclusive organizational relations are also expected to reduce agency costs, that is the costs associated with 
asymmetric information and contrasting objectives (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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These views were found again in influential works by Arrow (1972) and North (1990). In a famous 
paper, Arrow (1972) states that: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an 
element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly 
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of 
mutual confidence” (1972, p. 357). According to North (1990, p. 54) “the inability of societies to 
develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical 
stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World”.  
In our view, it is reasonable to extend this point by arguing that not only the well-functioning of 
markets but also, to a larger extent, the resilience of the economic system, rely on those institutions 
(whether formal or informal) that foster the sharing and diffusion of feelings of trust and norms of 
reciprocity.  
As we will better explain in the following sections, democratic and socially oriented organizations 
such as cooperatives may behave differently from any other type of enterprise in the way they affect 
workers’ values and beliefs. That is, their institutional structure may play a role in building trust 
inside and outside the organization. This kind of hypothesis has been already put forward, for 
example, by prominent authors in experimental law and economics. As Blair and Stout (2001, pp. 
1735-1736) write: 
“The experimental evidence indicates that decisions whether or not to trust others are in large part 
determined by social context rather than external payoffs. By altering social context-subjects’ perceptions of 
others’ beliefs, expectations, likely actions, and relationships to themselves-experimenters can reliably 
produce in subjects in social dilemmas everything from nearly universal trust to an almost complete absence 
of trust. In other words, most people behave as if they have two personalities or preference functions. One is 
competitive and self-regarding. The other is cooperative and other-regarding. Social framing is key in 
triggering when the cooperative personality emerges”. 
 
In our study we concentrate on labour relations, which represent one specific dimension of 
governance
7
. Labour relations provide a privileged viewpoint as they allow an in-depth analysis of 
the impact of inclusive governance on the endogenous emergence of trust. They are deeply rooted 
and intertwined with the working of the governance structure and of the production process.
8
 
                                                 
7
 We do this by concentrating on two main variables: the condition as worker employed by a cooperative firm, and the 
self-evaluated generation of trust towards other people due to working conditions. In so doing we correlate one 
objective dummy with one subjective rating. The correlation between objective and subjective variables is usually 
considered immune to spurious correlation due to common method bias, as evidenced by prominent methodological 
contributions (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
8
 We consider labour relations in cooperative enterprises in general, without separating different types of cooperatives 
(worker, producer, consumer etc…). Hence our results refer to the general category of cooperative firms, and not to 
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Hence, we expect that the possible beneficial effects connected with worker involvement and 
equality of rights exert the maximum impact in their case.  
 
3. Data and descriptive findings 
As outlined in the Introduction, data were collected through the administration of a questionnaire to 
a representative sample (n = 817) of the Italian Province of Trento in March 2011
9
. The 
questionnaire was specifically designed for the assessment of the impact of cooperative enterprises 
on various dimensions of social capital. The sample was stratified by age, gender and area of 
residence. Our dependent variable is given by responses to the question “Thinking about the 
difference between the day you started your current work and today, how do you think that the work 
environment has influenced your trust toward others?” which was asked to all individuals with work 
experience, i.e. current workers (53% of the sample), retired workers (23%), and temporarily 
unemployed workers (1.8%). We thus focus on this sub-sample of people who are currently 
working or have worked in the past, which includes 629 individuals representing approximately 
77% of the original sample
10
. As will be explained in Section 4, we control for sample selection 
bias in the empirical analysis. The distributions of frequencies across employees in cooperative 
enterprises, dependent workers, and the whole sample are reported in Table 1. It is worth noting 
that, in cooperative enterprises, nobody reports that the work environment has caused a decrease in 
social trust, unlike in the other categories of employment status
11
. 72.9% of workers in cooperatives 
report a work-driven increase in social trust. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In order to provide more observations in each category and to the purpose of a more reliable 
interpretation of marginal effects, we collapse “very negatively” and “negatively” responses and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
worker cooperatives alone. Unfortunately, we do not have at our disposition finer controls concerning employment in 
different types of cooperative.  
9
 The questionnaire was administered through computer assisted telephone interviews by the Technical Unit of the 
Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento. The administration of the questionnaire was 
funded by the European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises (Euricse) located in Trento. Since, 
according to the research design, about 800-900 observations were required, a sample of 8855 units (i.e. about ten times 
the number of required observations) was extracted from census data. People included in the selected sample received a 
letter in advance announcing the possibility of a phone interview and briefly describing the aim and scope of the 
research. There were 1587 dropouts, 1777 people refused to be interviewed, 136 people missed the phone appointment, 
and 162 phone numbers were not in use at the time of the interview. 4396 numbers were not used.  
10
 Results do not change if we consider the smaller sample of current worker. 
11
 Frequency distributions for public and private enterprises are not reported here for the sake of brevity. Tables are 
available upon request to the authors. 
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“positively and very positively” responses into two categories (1 = “the work environment 
negatively influenced social trust”, and 3 = “the work environment positively influenced social 
trust”, with 2 now meaning “not at all”). According to this new metric, workers’ responses are 
distributed as reported in Table 2 (for the sake of convenience, hereafter we will apply the label of 
“workers” to all individuals with work experience).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The main independent variable is employment status, which includes the condition of being 
employed as a dependent worker in private, public, cooperative or non-profit enterprises, self-
employed (as entrepreneur, head of family business, or member of the arts and professions), 
unemployed with previous work experience, and retired with a work pension.  
We are aware that there may be some degree of self selection of workers into a specific 
organizational type. Workers characterized by different attitudes, propensities, and preferences, are 
likely to choose different organizational forms in a way that better matches their personal 
characteristics. This implies that individuals with a higher propensity to trust others may be more 
willing to work in organizations characterised by democratic and participatory governance, such as 
cooperative enterprises. However, our dataset allows us to control for workers’ motivation in the 
choice of their current job, which can be considered as a proxy for individual preferences about 
aspirations, moral values and social norms of trust and reciprocity. More specifically, to deal with 
the self-selection problem, we control for the impact of intrinsic motivations. This control is 
relevant in the highly plausible hypothesis that intrinsically motivated individuals are also 
characterized by a stronger propensity to trust co-workers and other people. The hypothesis of a 
positive linkage between intrinsic motivations and the development of trust in the form of 
reciprocating behaviour was indeed confirmed by previous studies in experimental economics and 
psychology (Karagaretnam et al., 2009; Griesinger & Livingston, 1973; Liebrand, 1984; Frey and 
Jegen 2001; Degli Antoni 2009) and supported by contributions from law and economics (Blair and 
Stout, 2001; Marchegiani et al. 2011).  
Individuals were asked to rate which aspects were important in the choice to undertake/accept their 
current job on a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 5 (very important), with the explicit 
recommendation to focus on their ex ante expectations about the job, not on the actual realization of 
such expectations
12
. Nine items were proposed: 1. earnings and other economic incentives, 2. job 
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 This question was asked to all workers with job experience, i.e. current workers, retired workers and currently 
unemployed workers.  
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stability, 3. career perspectives, 4. flexibility in terms of work arrangements (e.g. the ability to 
choose one’s own working hours), 5. the desire to find a good work environment in terms of 
relationships with colleagues and superiors, 6. the sharing of values and ideas, 7. the search for 
social recognition, 8. the opportunity to do an interesting, stimulating or creative job, 9. the desire to 
be useful to others or, more generally, to society.  
We perform Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CatPCA) on the 9 items of motivation. 
We first perform the CatPCa considering a number of dimensions equal to the number of items (9). 
Two principal components are extracted with eigenvalue higher than 1.These two components are 
interpreted as representing intrinsic (component 1) and extrinsic (component 2) work motivations. 
Hence we perform again the CatPCA by including only two dimensions in the solution. The 
CatPCA allows us to convert the ordered Likert items into numerical variables, which are then used 
to perform Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
13
. The EFA confirms the results obtained with the 
CatPCA since two factors are extracted. As goodness of fit statistics we consider the generalized 
Cronbach’s Alpha index and the variance explained by the first two factors
14
. The first factor, which 
is highly correlated with the items measuring intrinsic motivation (items 5 through 9), explains in 
the rotated solution about 26% of the total variance in the data, while the second factor, which 
refers to the items of extrinsic motivation (items 1 through 4), explains 16% of the total variance. 
We then perform the reliability analysis on the two extracted groups of items by calculating the 
Cronbach’s Alpha. This is done to account for construct validity. The Cronbach Alpha’s for the 
intrinsic component is high, as it equals 0.81, and witnesses a high degree of internal consistency. 
The extrinsic component, on the other hand, shows a relatively low value Alpha (0.62). The low 
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 We use the Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CatPCA; Meulman et. al, 2004) for quantifying ordinal 
categories, with the number of the components p = 2, the number of the assumed subdimensions for the job motivations. 
The optimal quantifications are assigned to the categories of each item minimizing (by means of an alternating least 
squares algorithm) the following loss function simultaneously over O and the Yj’s: 
∑
=
−=
m
1j
2
jj ||YGO||trY)L(O,  
with tr||·||
2
  the trace operator of the squared norm of a matrix, Gj the indicator matrix of item j, O the n×p matrix of 
object scores for the n subjects, and Yj the matrix containing the category quantifications of item j. As goodness of fit 
statistics we consider the Generalized Cronbach’s Alpha (GCA) index and the Variance Accounted For (VAF) index, 
that are normalized (in the interval [0;100]) indices based on the total eigenvalue of the CatPCA solution. The 
quantified variables obtained from the CatPCA are then used for the standard Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)to 
identify the hypothesized sub-dimensions by inspecting the factor loadings of the rotated solution. 
14
In the EFA, the extraction method is Principal Axis Factoring. This allows us to concentrate on the variance shared by 
the latent dimensions, not on total variance. This explains the relatively low percentage of total variance explained by 
the two factors with eigenvalue higher than one (about 42%). We also performed factor analysis by using Principal 
Components as extraction method. The results do not change qualitatively but the amount of variance explained by the 
first two factors is 55%. We extract the rotated solution using the Varimax method with Kaiser normalization, which is 
preferred to the Oblimin method because it allows the analysis of the two latent dimensions as independent (orthogonal) 
dimensions. This assumption eases the analysis though, in practice, we cannot exclude a non-zero correlation between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. 
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amount of explained variance and of the Alpha leads us to interpret the extrinsic component as a 
residual one, in which all the non-intrinsic items are grouped. These items are perceived by workers 
as quite heterogeneous (as also testified by the low value of the communalities), though not to the 
point of constituting more than one latent construct (see the numerical output of CatPCA and of 
EFA in Appendix A). Finally, we extract factor scores for the two constructs, and use them in the 
econometric model. 
We categorize the first factor (items 5 to 9) as intrinsic motivations, and the second factor as 
extrinsic motivations (items 1 to 4). It is worth noting that, in principle, the intrinsic motivations 
measured in our questionnaire can be further sub-divided into intrinsic self-regarding motivations, 
which refer to individual non-material utility (items 5, 7 and 8), and intrinsic other-regarding 
motivations, which reflect the concern for values and the utility of other people (items 6 and 9). As 
said, factor analysis allows the extraction of only one factor including both self and other-regarding 
intrinsic motivations. This result provides support for the hypothesis that different types of intrinsic 
motivations are complementary rather than substitute (Degli Antoni 2009; Becchetti et al., 2012). 
It can be expected that organizations matching specific kinds of preference may have been able to 
develop specific incentive mixes that are particularly able to satisfy those preferences. For example, 
workers with low intrinsic motivations may be more likely to work in organizations that favour 
extrinsic or more materialistic motives. Hence, controlling for workers’ preferences also entails 
indirect control of the features of the organization. As our results suggest, organizations that match 
the expectations of workers with high intrinsic motivations also appear better able to generate trust. 
Furthermore, as hypothesized, individuals characterised by intrinsic motivations are likely to have a 
stronger propensity to trust co-workers and other people. Hence, intrinsic motivations are 
introduced in the econometric model with the additional aim of further addressing possible self-
selection phenomena. It is worth remembering that self-selection issues are also addressed through 
the particular way the trust question is asked, i.e. with the explicit request to focus on the specific 
impact of the work environment, which is not related to their pre-existing preferences and attitudes. 
We also control for the status of being a director of a cooperative enterprise. This is done to account 
for a possible role of directors of cooperatives in favouring (or halting) the generation of trust. 
These officers are elected by members on a “one member, one vote” basis, and are in charge of 
defining the main strategic objectives of the organization and of appointing the managers. Italian 
legislation does not require directors to be part of the membership. Indeed, they can be very 
different types of people, such as professionals, unpaid volunteers, or retired ex-members. 
Other individual characteristics and behaviours that may influence both workers’ attitude to 
developing social trust and the choice to undertake/accept a job are related to social capital. Social 
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trust is indeed considered as an important, “cognitive”, dimension of the broader concept of social 
capital. Following the seminal contribution by Uphoff (1999), the literature generally distinguishes 
between structural and cognitive dimensions of the concept (Kawachi and Kennedy 1997; Sabatini 
2008; 2009; Degli Antoni and Sacconi 2009). Structural social capital deals with individuals’ 
behaviours and mainly takes the form of informal networks and associations which can be observed 
and measured through surveys. Cognitive social capital derives from individuals’ perceptions 
resulting in norms, values and beliefs that may contribute to the adoption of cooperative behaviours 
(Yamamura 2011; Antoci et al. 2012). These latter aspects involve subjective evaluations of the 
social and institutional environment in which the individual is embedded, which may affect the 
individual’s propensity to trust others. The complexity of social capital is further stressed by the 
existence of deep and changeable relations between its sub-dimensions. Social norms of trust and 
reciprocity prompt cooperative behaviours, in turn fostering the accumulation of durable ties 
(Carpenter et al. 2004; Fehr 2009). 
In this paper, following a consolidated praxis in the social capital literature, we measure the 
structural dimensions of the concept as the informal and formal networks of relationships to which 
the worker belongs. For informal networks, we use measures of the frequency of meetings with 
relatives and with friends, as given by two ordinal variables obtained from responses to the 
questions: “How often do you see your relatives?” and “How often do you see your friends?”
15
. 
Participation in formal networks is measured through two binary variables coded as 1 if the 
interviewee is a member of at least one organization. Following the literature, we distinguish 
between “Olsonian” and “Putnam-esque” associations (see for example Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Yamamura 2012). We define as “Olsonian” those organizations which have redistributive goals and 
thus lobby for the protection of their members’ interests possibly against the interests of other 
groups (Olson 1965; 1982). Examples of this type of organization are professional and 
entrepreneurial associations, trade unions, and associations for the protection of consumers’ rights. 
We define as “Putnam-esque” those associations least likely to act as “distributional coalitions but 
which involve social interactions that can build trust and cooperative habits” (Knack and Kefeer 
1997, p. 1273). Examples of this type of organization are cultural circles, sport clubs, youth 
associations (e.g. scouts), and religious organizations.  
An individual variable that may significantly influence the workers’ attitude to developing social 
trust within the work environment is the existence of friendships with colleagues. Friendships often 
                                                 
15
 Possible responses to these questions were given on a scale from 1 = “I do not have relatives/friends” to 7 = “Every 
day”, with 2 = “Never”, 3 = “A few times per year”, 4 = “A few times per month”, 5 = “Once per week”, and 6 = “More 
than once per week”. As for meetings with relatives, interviewers were explicitly required to refer to non-cohabiting 
relatives.  
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start at the workplace, since work structures are a generator of face-to-face interactions that 
stimulate the sharing of social norms and the creation of interpersonal ties (Putnam 2000; Schur 
2003; Antoci et al. 2011). Friendships with colleagues may favour the development of social trust 
as a consequence of on-the-job interactions. In order to control for this possibility, we include in our 
regressions an indicator of the frequency of meetings with colleagues, as measured by responses to 
the question: “How often do you see your colleagues outside of the workplace, in your leisure 
time?”, as given on the same 1-7 scale described in footnote 12. 
For the cognitive dimension of social capital, we include in our regressions indicators of vertical 
trust and tolerance. Vertical trust is measured through the scores from 1 to 10 given by respondents 
to three questions concerning the extent to which the Parliament, the judicial system, and local 
politicians can be trusted, with 1 meaning “Not at all” and 10 meaning “Totally”
 16
. 
Tolerance was measured through the score given by respondents on a 5-point scale to the question: 
“Would you be willing to have non-EU immigrants as neighbours?”, with 1 meaning “Very 
unwilling” and 5 meaning “Very willing”. We chose to use immigrants as the benchmark for 
respondents’ level of tolerance because immigration and natives’ feelings of fear and intolerance 
towards non-EU immigrants have been one of the central issues of the political debate over the last 
twenty years, especially in the northern regions of Italy. 
We also include the following demographic and socio-economic controls: gender, age, area of 
residence (urban vs. rural), education, and economic well-being. The indicator of economic well-
being is given by responses to the question: “Is your household’s income sufficient to see you 
through to the end of the month?”. Fourteen per cent of interviewees answered “with great 
difficulty” or “with difficulty” and we define them as poor. 
In addition, we account for some ecological variables measured at the level of Local Labour 
Systems. Italy’s Local Labour Systems (LLSs) are defined as self-contained labour markets with 
respect to daily commuting trips. The Italian territory is partitioned by the Italian National Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT) into 686 local labour systems using the Population Census of 2001. The 
Province of Trento includes 17 LLSs.  
In particular, we account for: 1. an indicator of the propensity for export by local firms, computed 
by ISTAT (2010). 2. the share of immigrants on the total population of the LLS. 3. The 
unemployment rate in the LLS, which may be a determinant of workers’ occupational choices. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables adopted in the analysis.  
 
                                                 
16
 We accounted for local politicians instead of politicians in general, because the Province of Trento has autonomous 
jurisdiction relative to the Italian state on most social issues. Hence we consider the provincial rather than the national 
context as the relevant unit of political analysis. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
4. Econometric findings 
We model the variation in social trust caused by the work environment as an ordered probit model, 
after having tested the assumption of constancy of effects across categories assumed in this model.  
Since we can observe the effect of work in the creation of social trust only for the sample of 
workers, we estimate an ordered probit with sample selection using a two step procedure. First, we 
estimate a probit equation for the probability of working (or of having worked in the past, for retired 
or unemployed workers) and we derive the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). We then include IMR as a 
regressor in the ordered probit model. Since we find no evidence of selection bias, we report 
estimates without the correction factor
17
. 
We define three dichotomous variables:  
1
2
3
1 if the work negatively influenced social trust
0 otherwise
1 if the work did not influence social trust
0 otherwise
1 if the work positively influenced social trust
0 otherwise
i
i
i
y
y
y

= 


= 


= 

  
and an index zi for individual i by  iii exz += β . The model can thus be written as 
1
1
2
1 2
3
2
1 if 
1 if 
1 if 
i i
i i
i i
y y c
y c y c
y y c
= <
= < <
= >
 
where 1c  and 2c  are the thresholds that the latent variable must cross to change the value of z. It 
follows that, assuming ( )10,Nei ∈ : 
1 ' '
1 1
2 ' ' ' '
1 2 2 1
3 1 2 '
2
prob( 1) Pr( ) ( )
prob( 1) Pr( ) ( ) ( )
prob( 1) 1 prob( 1) prob( 1) 1 ( )
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i
y e c x c x
y c x e c x c x c x
y y y c x
β β
β β β β
β
= = < − = Φ −
= = − ≤ < − = Φ − −Φ −
= = − = − = = −Φ −
 
where ( )Φ ⋅  is the cumulative standard normal density.  
Table 4 presents the results of the ordered probit estimates. To compare relative magnitudes of the 
effects of the independent variables, we report their marginal effects. In model 1 (column 1 of Table 
                                                 
17
 As a further check we performed all the regression presented in Section 4 including IMRs among regressors. Their 
coefficient were always not statistically significant. Results of regressions are not presented in the paper for the sake of 
brevity and are available upon request to the authors. 
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4), we principally focus on employment status, social capital, and on a number of covariates 
representing individual socio-demographic and economic characteristics. In model 2 (column 2 of 
Table 4) we include motivations. Column 3 presents the estimates with fixed effects.  
Among employment conditions, the status of being employed in a cooperative enterprise is the only 
significant predictor of the dependent variable. More specifically, workers in cooperative 
enterprises exhibit a 24 percentage point higher likelihood that work has driven an increase in their 
social trust from 52%. All of the other employment conditions – i.e. employment in a private or 
nonprofit enterprise, self-employment and temporary employment (lavoro interinale) are not 
statistically significant.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
If we include motivations in the trust equation (column 2), we observe a slight increase in the 
significance and size of the effect of employment in cooperative enterprises, which is now equal to 
25 percentage points from 52%. The effect remains striking, in that the status of being employed in 
a cooperative enterprise raises by 47.5% the probability that the current job has improved the social 
trust of workers in respect to the status of being employed in a public enterprise (which is the 
omitted category in the models presented in Table 4)
18
.  
The replacement of the omitted category does not change the significance and size of the marginal 
effects and allows us to make further interesting comparisons. Marginal effects of employment 
statuses are compared in Table 5. Being employed in a cooperative enterprise increases the 
probability that work has improved the social trust of workers by 36.9% relative to employment in 
private enterprise and by 51% relative to self-employment. As we stated in the introductory 
sections, the institutional set-up and the features of the working environment may matter in 
favouring the emergence of trust. Our result seems to support the hypothesis that  the inclusive and 
democratic features of governance in cooperatives may favour the emergence of trust due to their 
inherent participatory, horizontal, and fair nature.  
Being a director of a cooperative enterprise raises the likelihood of developing work-driven social 
trust by 17 percentage points from 52%. This result may signal, again, the positive role of flat 
(horizontal) and egalitarian governance. Being elected by members with equal decision making 
power, elected directors find themselves relating to members in more a horizontal than hierarchical 
                                                 
18
 Results do not show any significant change if we perform the regressions in the sub sample of current workers. The 
marginal effect of employment in cooperative enterprises on the work-driven development of trust is .24, the t-value 
being 2.95. Workers in cooperative enterprises exhibit a 24 percentage point higher likelihood that work has driven an 
increase in their social trust from 51%. The marginal effect of intrinsic motivations is equal to .16 (t-value is equal to 
5.36). Full estimates are not presented here for the sake of brevity and are available upon request to the authors.  
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way. Horizontal interaction between directors and members can, again, favour the emergence of 
trust. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Workers who have been driven by intrinsic motivations in their choice of job exhibit a significant 
and 16 percentage point higher likelihood that the work experience has improved their social trust. 
Being driven by extrinsic motivations decreases the likelihood of developing social trust on the job 
by 3 percentage points. As explained in Section 3, the inclusion of motivations in the trust equations 
is intended to allow us to control for the self-selection of workers characterized by stronger 
propensity to trust. This result also confirms that intrinsic motivations are likely to represent one of 
the main preconditions for developing trust.  
As expected, some dimensions of individuals’ social capital are significantly and positively 
correlated with the dependent variable. Members in one or more Putnam-esque associations have a 
16 percentage point higher probability of having increased their social trust as a consequence of 
their work experience. The habit of meeting friends and colleagues presents a positive but 
statistically weak correlation with the work-driven increase in social trust. This finding seems to 
support Putnam’s (2000) view of those voluntary associations which do not have redistributive aims 
as “schools of democracy”, from where cooperative values and trust may be “socialized”. In the 
author’s words, certain associations “instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and 
public-spiritedness” (Putnam 1993, pp. 89–90) which may also benefit non-members and, to a 
certain extent, society as a whole. 
However, any generalization of this result should be handled with extreme caution, for at least two 
reasons. The ability of interpersonal interactions between members of organizations to create habits 
and attitudes towards serving the greater good is very likely to vary with culture and institutions. 
For example, religious organizations – which, in our empirical analysis, are classified among 
Putnam-esque organizations – may differ in prompting their members on the desirability to behave 
altruistically toward strangers (Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack 2002). Second, this result may suffer 
from endogeneity problems, as both membership in associations and the individual propensity of 
workers to develop social trust as a consequence of their interaction with the work environment 
may be influenced by omitted variables. 
In order to eliminate local-specific heterogeneity which may simultaneously affect both workers’ 
employment choices and work-driven changes in their level of trust, we also run regressions with 
local fixed effects computed at the level of local labour systems. Results are reported in column 3 of 
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Table 4. We do not record significant changes but a very slight decrease in the marginal effect of 
the role of employment in cooperative enterprises and of membership in Putnam-esque associations.  
The status of being employed in a cooperative enterprise now increases the probability that work 
has improved social trust by 44.1% in respect to employment in public enterprises, and by 34.4% in 
respect to employment in private enterprises. Workers in cooperative enterprises have a 51.3% 
higher likelihood to have developed social trust due to their work experience in respect to self-
employed workers.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature by presenting the first econometric investigation into the role 
of cooperative enterprises in the creation of social trust in a comparative perspective.  
Our findings suggest that, unlike any other type of enterprise, cooperatives have a particular ability 
to foster the development of social trust. This result supports the view that the development of 
cooperative enterprises – and, more generally, of less hierarchical models of governance and of not 
purely profit maximizing forms of enterprises – may play a crucial role in the diffusion of trust and 
in the accumulation of social capital. Trust reduces uncertainty and transaction costs, enforces 
contracts, and facilitates credit at the level of individual investors, thereby enhancing the efficiency 
of exchanges and encouraging investment in ideas, human capital and physical capital. As argued 
by classical economists, trust is one of the pillars of the well-functioning of markets and, in the long 
run, of economic development. The resilience of the economic system also depends on its ability to 
foster, or at least to preserve, the diffusion of trust among individuals, specially in times of crisis. 
Our finding thus suggests that cooperatives may play an important role in strengthening the 
resilience to crisis in most economic systems.  
Though we strived, through the logic of our arguments and through the effectiveness of empirical 
tests, to demonstrate the existence of a causal connection between the spread of cooperatives and 
the development of trust, we hasten to add that we have not been able to demonstrate causation in a 
definitive way (Wright, 1934; Pearl, 2012). The cross sectional design of the survey has prevented 
us from controlling for fixed effects at the individual level. In addition, we did not carry out fully 
randomized experiments, and we have not been able to single out suitable instrumental variables. 
Hence we cannot exclude the existence of some form of endogeneity leading to inconsistent 
estimates. Omitted variables and self-selection are the most likely candidates for such 
inconsistency. Despite these limitations, however, our work also shows important strengths in that it 
is the first study in which trust and the accumulation of social capital have been firmly anchored to 
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the features of labour relations and to one specific organizational form, the cooperative enterprise, 
which is characterized by inclusive and horizontal governance.     
 
Tables 
 
 
Table 1. How do you think that the work environment has influenced your trust towards others? 
 Full sub-sample 
(past and present 
workers) 
Present workers 
Past and present 
employees 
Present 
employees 
Past and present 
coop enterprise 
workers 
Current coop 
enterprise 
workers 
 Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Very 
negatively 
23 3.66 17 3.99 19 3.48 14 4.03 0 0 0 0 
Negatively 44 7.01 30 7.04 37 6.78 23 6.63 0 0 0 0 
No effect 226 35.99 160 37.56 198 36.26 133 38.33 13 27.8 12 30 
Positively 222 35.35 151 35.45 188 34.43 118 34.01 20 41.67 16 40 
Very 
positively 
101 16.8 65 15.26 93 17.03 57 16.43 15 31.25 12 30 
Does not 
know 
12 1.91 3 0.70 11 2.01 2 0.58 0 0 0 0 
Tot 628 100 426 100 546 100 347 100 48 100 40 100 
 
 
 
Table 2. How do you think that the work environment has influenced your trust towards others? 
 Full sub-sample 
(past and present 
workers) 
Present workers 
Past and present 
employees 
Present 
employees 
Past and present 
coop enterprise 
workers 
Current coop 
enterprise 
workers 
 Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Negatively 67 10.88 47 11.11 56 10.47 37 10.72 0 0 0 0 
No effect 226 36.69 160 37.83 198 37.01 133 38.55 13 27.08 12 30 
Positively 323 52.44 216 51.06 281 52.52 175 50.72 35 72.92 28 70 
Tot 616 100 423 100 535 100 345 100 48 100 40 100 
Note: missing observations (i.e. “does not know” replies) are not accounted for in the table 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variables Obs Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Employed in private enterprises 814 .32 .47 0      1 
Employed in public enterprises 814 .28 .45 0 1 
Employed in cooperative enterprises 814 .06 .24 0 1 
Employed in nonprofit enterprises 814 .01 .10 0 1 
Self-employed 817 .09 .29 0 1 
Temporary employee (interinale, parasubordinato) 817 .01 .10 0 1 
Unemployed worker 817 .02 .13 0 1 
Retired worker 817 .23 .42 0     1 
Director in a coop enterprise 817 .05 .22 0 1 
Motivations 
Intrinsic motivations 564 6.75e-10 .89 -3.18 1.28 
Extrinsic motivations 564 -1.50e-09 .81 -2.95 .97 
Social capital      
Meetings with relatives 816 6.14 1.26 1 7 
Meetings with friends 814 5.61 1.23 1 7 
Meetings with colleagues 734 3.40 1.79 1 7 
Membership in Putnam-esque associations 817 .15 .36 0 1 
Membership in Olsonian associations 817 .14 .35 0 1 
Trust in the judicial system 817 5.83 2.38 1 10 
Trust in the Parliament 817 4.12 2.21 1 10 
Trust in local politicians 817 5.30 2.30 1 10 
Tolerance 817 2.94 1.19 1 5 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
Gender (female) 817 .52 .50 0 1 
Age (put categories here) 817 2.47 1.09 1 4 
Area of residence (urban vs. rural) 817 .36 .48 0 1 
Low education 813 .43 .49 0 1 
Mean education 813 .41 .49 0 1 
High education 813 .16 .37 0 1 
Poor 817 .15 37 0 1 
Ecological controls 
LLS propensity for export 817 46.24 13.88 .37 65.68 
LLS immigrants share of the population 817 .03 .01 .02 .04 
LLS unemployment rate 817 4.28 .76 3.32 7.69 
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Table 4. Ordered probit estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Marginal 
effect 
t stat. 
Marginal 
effect 
t stat. 
Marginal 
effect. 
t stat. 
Employment status    
Employed in private enterprises .07 1.31 .07 1.40 .06 0.75 
Employed in cooperative enterprises .24 3.23 .25 3.47 .23 2.73 
Nonprofit enterprises -.08 -0.56 -.08 -0.56 -.08 -0.31 
Self-employed .01 -0.15 .02 -0.27 .05 -0.40 
Temporary employee (interinale, parasubordinato) .05 -0.42 .07 -0.61 .03 -0.26 
Unemployed worker .08 -0.75 .09 -0.87 -.06 -0.41 
Retired worker -.08 -0.90 -.09 -1.10 -.10 -1.48 
Director in a coop enterprise .17 1.93 .17 1.98 .15 1.32 
Motivations    
Intrinsic motivations   .16 6.42 .14 4.49 
Extrinsic motivations   -.05 -1.78 -.03 -2.81 
Social capital       
Meetings with relatives .00 0.27 .01 0.35 .01 0.49 
Meetings with friends .04 1.79 .04 2.32 .04 2.67 
Meetings with colleagues .03 1.76 .02 1.58 .02 1.40 
Membership in Putnam-esque associations .15 2.53 .16 2.65 .14 2.73 
Membership in Olsonian associations .03 0.52 .03 0.45 .04 0.60 
Trust in the judicial system -.01 -0.56 -.01 -0.78 .01 -0.72 
Trust in the Parliament .00 0.48 .01 0.56 .01 1.43 
Trust in local politicians .01 0.77 .01 0.85 .00 0.79 
Tolerance -.01 -0.34 -.01 -0.44 .00 -0.11 
Demographic, social and economic characteristics    
Gender (female) .00 0.09 .01 0.18 .01 0.95 
Age .06 1.64 .07 1.94 .07 1.23 
Area of residence (urban vs. rural) .08 1.62 .08 1.62 .06 6.17 
Low education .08 1.22 .09 1.30 .10 1.70 
Mean education .04 0.64 .03 0.50 .05 0.62 
Poor .00 0.00 -.01 -0.19 .03 -0.54 
Ecological variables    
LLS propensity for export -.00 -0.29 -.00 -0.20   
LLS immigrants share of the population 2.58 0.57 2.23 0.48   
LLS unemployment rate .02 0.83 .02 0.82   
Observations 530 527 525 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.103 
Wald chi
2
 108.40 113.95 243.93 
Prob > chi
2
      0.00 0.00 0.00 
Omitted categories: employment in a public enterprise | self-regarding motivations | High education 
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Table 5. Comparative effect of employment in cooperative enterprises on the development of social trust  
  Employment in  
public enterprises 
Employment in  
private enteprises 
Self-employment 
  Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 
Comparative effect +47.5% + 44.1% + 36.9% + 34.4% + 44.1% + 51.3% Effect of 
employment in coop 
enterprises on social 
trust of workers 
Marginal effect and 
t-value 
.25 
(3.47) 
.23 
(2.73) 
.19 
(2.49) 
.18 
(2.87) 
.23 
(2.73) 
.27 
(3.05) 
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Appendix A - Categorical Principal Components Analysis and Factor Analysis 
 
Categorical principal components analysis 
 
 
Model Summary 
Variance 
Accounted For 
Dimension 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Total 
(Eigenvalue) 
1 .789 3.350 
2 .357 1.464 
Total .891a 4.814 
a. Total Cronbach's Alpha is based on the total 
Eigenvalue. 
 
Correlations Transformed Variables 
 V3410_1 V3410_2 V3410_3 V3410_4 V3410_5 V3410_6 V3410_7 V3410_8 V3410_9 
V3410_1a 1.000 .320 .340 .252 .198 .090 .247 .045 .049 
V3410_2a .320 1.000 .258 .209 .216 .080 .209 .047 .158 
V3410_3a .340 .258 1.000 .280 .259 .171 .248 .254 .153 
V3410_4a .252 .209 .280 1.000 .322 .284 .314 .288 .222 
V3410_5a .198 .216 .259 .322 1.000 .440 .395 .445 .386 
V3410_6a .090 .080 .171 .284 .440 1.000 .426 .444 .512 
V3410_7a .247 .209 .248 .314 .395 .426 1.000 .381 .405 
V3410_8a .045 .047 .254 .288 .445 .444 .381 1.000 .458 
V3410_9a .049 .158 .153 .222 .386 .512 .405 .458 1.000 
Dimension 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Eigenvalue 3.264 1.432 .804 .715 .680 .601 .553 .509 .441 
a. Missing values were imputed with the mode of the quantified variable 
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Component Loadings 
Dimension 
 
1 2 
V3410_1 .389 .688 
V3410_2 .382 .564 
V3410_3 .526 .456 
V3410_4 .592 .209 
V3410_5 .725 -.093 
V3410_6 .707 -.376 
V3410_7 .705 -.028 
V3410_8 .675 -.356 
V3410_9 .669 -.379 
Variable Principal Normalization. 
 
 
Factor analysis 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
V3410_1 Quantification .243 .446 
V3410_2 Quantification .203 .271 
V3410_3 Quantification .262 .355 
V3410_4 Quantification .231 .284 
V3410_5 Quantification .402 .470 
V3410_6 Quantification .434 .552 
V3410_7 Quantification .337 .400 
V3410_8 Quantification .409 .498 
V3410_9 Quantification .415 .496 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Facto
r Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % 
1 3.453 38.371 38.371 2.897 32.184 32.184 2.368 26.310 26.310 
2 1.461 16.230 54.601 .874 9.715 41.899 1.403 15.589 41.899 
3 .762 8.461 63.063       
4 .703 7.816 70.879       
5 .661 7.340 78.219       
6 .568 6.315 84.534       
7 .538 5.982 90.515       
8 .472 5.250 95.765       
9 .381 4.235 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Rotated Factor Matrixa 
Factor 
 
1 2 
V3410_1 Quantification   .668 
V3410_2 Quantification   .513 
V3410_3 Quantification   .551 
V3410_4 Quantification .360 .393 
V3410_5 Quantification .607 .318 
V3410_6 Quantification .738   
V3410_7 Quantification .537 .334 
V3410_8 Quantification .698   
V3410_9 Quantification .700   
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.   
 
